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Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and Williams syndrome (WS) both are neurodevelop-
mental disorders, each with a unique social phenotypic pattern. This review article aims to
define the similarities and differences between the social phenotypes of ASD and WS. We
review studies that have examined individuals withWS using diagnostic assessments such
as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), cross-syndrome direct compari-
son studies, and studies that have individually examined either disorder. We conclude that
(1) individuals with these disorders show quite contrasting phenotypes for face processing
(i.e., preference to faces and eyes) and sociability (i.e., interest in and motivation to interact
with others), and (2) although the ADOS and a direct comparison study on pragmatic lan-
guage ability suggest more deficits in ASD, individuals with WS are similarly impaired on
social cognition and communicative skills. In light of these results, we discuss how cross-
syndrome comparisons between ASD and WS can contribute to developmental theory,
cognitive neuroscience, and the development and choice of clinical treatments.
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INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and Williams syndrome (WS)
both are neurodevelopmental disorders. ASD are a group of per-
vasive developmental disorders usually first seen in childhood,
characterized by impairment of social interaction and commu-
nication, and by restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped behaviors
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Approximately half of
individuals with ASD have a mild to profound intellectual disabil-
ity and the other half have cognitive abilities within the normal
range of intelligence, while a minority have intelligent quotients
well above normal (Joseph, 2011). WS is a rare genetic neu-
rodevelopmental disorder, which is caused by a microdeletion of
chromosome 7q11.23 (Ewart et al., 1993). This deletion can be
confirmed by fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) genetic
test. Most individuals with WS have a borderline to moderate
intellectual disability (Mervis and John, 2010).
Autism spectrum disorders and WS have been described as
“opposite” disorders in terms of their social behavior (e.g., Jones
et al., 2000). However, there are very few detailed comparisons
of the social phenotypes of ASD and WS, including aspects such
as social cognition and communicative skills (see Tager-Flusberg
et al., 2006 for a review of face recognition and emotion processing
with ASD and WS). A better understanding of the similarities and
differences between these two disorders could provide insights into
gene-brain-behavior relationships. Recently, some genetic studies
have begun to identify genes related to both ASD and WS (Feyder
et al., 2010; Sanders et al., 2011). Therefore, from the perspec-
tive of behavioral genetics, it is important to determine detailed
social phenotypes of ASD and WS. In this article, we will review
the social phenotypes of these disorders with respect to the fol-
lowing domains: diagnostic assessments, face processing, social
cognition, sociability, and communicative skills. After that, we will
discuss how a cross-syndrome comparison between ASD and WS
can contribute to developmental theory, cognitive neuroscience,
and the development and choice of clinical treatments.
DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENTS
Earlier studies have reported concurrence of autism and WS (Reiss
et al., 1985; Gillberg et al., 1991; Gillberg and Rasmussen, 1994).
For example, Gillberg and Rasmussen (1994) provided case reports
of four children who had concurrent autism and WS within 60 WS
cases registered in their clinic. However, there have been no sys-
tematic studies using standardized assessments, and therefore how
many individuals with WS would have ASD and how many deficits
related to ASD they would have is unknown.
Recently, studies of individuals with ASD and those with WS
have been done using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS; Lord et al., 1999). The ADOS is a structured interaction
designed to assess play, reciprocal social interaction, and com-
munication skills, and to diagnose ASD across a range of ages.
Lincoln et al. (2007) assessed both children with WS and age-
and IQ-equivalent children with autistic disorder using the ADOS
Module 1. Among their sample, the DSM-IV (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994) criteria placed 20% of the children
with WS in the ASD range. Of the 20% group, half met cri-
teria for autistic disorder, and half for pervasive developmental
disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). The ADOS algo-
rithm placed 10% of the children with WS in the ASD range.
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Of the 10% group, half met criteria for autism, and half for
autism spectrum. They found that many children with WS showed
some problems in using pointing (55%), initiating joint atten-
tion (50%), and showing an object to another person (65%), but
few showed symptoms involving shared enjoyment in interaction
(0%), facial expressions directed to others (5%), and quality of
social overtures (10%). In addition, they reported that the WS
group showed fewer problem behaviors in all of the ADOS items
than the autistic disorder group, and a discriminant analysis of
ADOS behaviors classified 100% of the cases consistent with their
original diagnosis.
On the other hand, Klein-Tasman et al. (2009) empha-
sized overlaps of ASD with WS, compared with Lincoln et al.
(2007). They examined children with WS, autism, PDD-NOS, and
mixed etiology non-spectrum developmental disabilities,using the
ADOS Module 1. The ADOS algorithm classified the children with
WS as autism (10%), autism spectrum (40%), and non-spectrum
(50%). Moreover, the WS group showed fewer sociocommunica-
tive abnormalities than the autism group, but about the same as
the PDD-NOS group. Klein-Tasman et al. (2009) explained that
their results differed from the Lincoln et al. (2007) study because
the level of difficulties in their WS sample was more severe than
that of Lincoln et al. Also, they did stricter assessments as their
sample was well matched with the targets of the ADOS Module
1 compared to those of Lincoln et al. The higher rate at which
individuals with WS were categorized as ASD in the Lincoln et al.
(2007) and Klein-Tasman et al. (2009) studies might be related
to the expanded notion of autism as a spectrum disorder. Klein-
Tasman et al. (2007) reported the detailed data of these children
with WS.
These studies taken together, using the ADOS, found a cer-
tain percentage of individuals with WS showed problem behaviors
indicative of ASD, and they were indeed classified as ASD, although
the extent of sociocommunicative deficits was less with WS. As
Lincoln et al. (2007) pointed out, the quality of some social behav-
iors (e.g., quality of social overtures) indeed is different between
ASD and WS. However, taking into consideration that half of the
children with WS were categorized as ASD (Klein-Tasman et al.,
2009), we should keep in mind some autistic traits exist within
WS. Exploring which social phenotypes are similarly impaired
could contribute to understanding the mechanisms of these two
disorders. In the following sections, we will take a closer look at
similarities and differences between ASD and WS in each social
phenotype.
FACE PROCESSING
Most of the direct comparison studies between ASD and WS are
with respect to face processing. Riby and Hancock (2008, 2009a,b)
examined the way individuals with ASD or WS viewed social stim-
uli by using eye-tracking techniques. Riby and Hancock (2008)
showed photographs of human actors to individuals with autism
or WS and typically developing individuals matched for chrono-
logical age or non-verbal ability. The individuals with autism spent
less time than the control groups viewing actors’ faces, but the
opposite pattern was found for individuals with WS. A detailed
analysis showed that, while individuals with autism spent less time
viewing the eyes, individuals with WS spent more time on the
eye region than the control groups. Similar results were reported
using static cartoon images and movies containing human actors
or cartoon characters by Riby and Hancock (2009b). The dis-
tinct difference between ASD and WS regarding interest in faces
also was found in other types of eye-tracking studies. Riby and
Hancock (2009a) examined how individuals with autism or WS
viewed scrambled pictures containing faces and pictures of scenes
with embedded faces. They reported that individuals with autism
showed fewer and shorter fixations on faces, while individuals with
WS showed prolonged fixations on faces.
The way that individuals with ASD or WS view faces relates
to their face matching skills. Riby et al. (2009) provided individ-
uals with autism or WS unfamiliar face matching tasks, which
required the participants to use eyes and mouth cues. Individu-
als with autism in general performed relatively poorly on these
matching tasks, and showed particular deficits when they needed
to use the eyes region. On the other hand, individuals with WS
showed the typical pattern of performance, with greater accuracy
using the eyes than the mouth region.
In addition, Riby et al. (2008) directly compared the face
processing skills of ASD and WS individuals. They showed that
children and adolescents with WS performed better on process-
ing expressions of emotion (pointing to an image of the person
depicting an expression verbalized by the researcher, and match-
ing different faces showing the same expressions) and the direction
of eye-gazes (pointing to the face that was looking at the partic-
ipants, and matching the persons looking in a named direction)
than their counterparts with autism matched for non-verbal abil-
ity and chronological age. However, Lacroix et al. (2009) reported
a different finding with emotion recognition. They used an emo-
tion identification task which required participants to point out
the person who expressed a certain emotion among three pictures,
and found that children with WS performed worse than children
with autism and typically developing children (these groups were
matched for verbal mental age).
Taken together, individuals with WS show preference to faces
and eyes to a greater extent even than typically developing indi-
viduals, while individuals with ASD do not. In addition, although
more studies are needed, individuals with WS perform better on
some face processing tasks (i.e., matching faces and processing
eye-gaze directions) than those with ASD, but mixed findings were
obtained regarding emotion recognition.
SOCIAL COGNITION
Social cognitive ability is thought to be one of the most impaired
domains of ASD, and considerable effort has been made to research
false belief understanding. In Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) seminal
study, performance on a false belief task was worse by children
with autism than by children with Down syndrome or typically
developing children. Another study showed that the acquisition
of a first-order false belief with autism was considerably delayed.
The verbal mental age at which 50% of participants passed the
false belief task was 4 years for typically developing children, and
9 years 2 months for those with autism (Happé, 1995). A recent
study using the eye-tracking version of the false belief task suggests
this difficulty is found even among adults with Asperger syndrome
(Senju et al., 2009).
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 247 | 2
Asada and Itakura Autism and Williams syndrome
Although there are many studies revealing the impairment of
false belief understanding by those with ASD (e.g., Perner et al.,
1989; Leekam and Perner, 1991; Leslie and Thaiss, 1992), rel-
atively few studies of this sort have been done regarding WS.
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) used the false belief task and
compared the performance of children with WS to that of age-,
IQ-, and language ability-matched children with Prader–Willi syn-
drome (a genetic disorder resulting from the loss of paternal gene
expression at chromosome 15q11-q13), and children with non-
specific mental retardation. They showed that the number of WS
participants who passed the task was significantly fewer than in the
Prader–Willi syndrome group or the non-specific mental retarda-
tion group, suggesting impairment of false belief understanding
with WS.
The finding of Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) is partly sup-
ported by a subsequent study using a different paradigm. Porter
et al. (2008) used a non-verbal picture sequencing task that assesses
understanding of false beliefs. They showed that individuals with
WS performed worse than mental age-matched typically develop-
ing children. However, they also reported that this result was found
only for a subgroup of WS, who had better verbal skills compared
to their overall mental age.
The impairment of false belief understanding in WS might be
surprising given that language promotes false belief understand-
ing (e.g., Farrar and Maag, 2002) and vocabulary skills are not so
impaired in WS (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000; Brock, 2007). However,
although data from individuals with ASD support the notion that
vocabulary ability correlates with performance on a false belief
task (Happé, 1995), we may assume, at least in some developmen-
tal disorders, that language is not enough for the acquisition of
false belief understanding. This idea is supported by a recent study
that revealed individuals with Asperger syndrome could not pass a
non-verbal version of a false belief task, even if they have adequate
verbal skills and indeed passed a traditional verbal false belief task
(Senju et al., 2009). Furthermore, as discussed in the following
section on joint attention development, this idea also is consistent
with the notion that in ASD and WS, developmental pathways for
language and social cognition are unique and relatively unrelated
compared with typical development.
Joint attention skills are another aspect of social cognition that
has been examined in ASD and WS. Joint attention is thought to
be a precursor to complex social cognitive ability (Baron-Cohen,
1995), and there is a relationship between early joint attention
behavior and performance on the false belief task (Charman et al.,
2000). Deficits in joint attention behaviors with ASD have been
found by a number of studies (Curcio, 1978; Mundy et al., 1986;
Sigman et al., 1986; Baron-Cohen, 1989).
Mundy et al. (1986) used the Early Social Communication
Scales (ESCS; Seibert and Hogan, 1982), a semi-structured obser-
vation session to assess a variety of communicative behaviors
between the tester and children, with children with autism and
children with mental retardation matched for chronological age
and mental age. They found that, compared to children with
mental retardation, children with autism showed less turn-taking
behavior, and less eye contact with the tester. Also, Sigman et al.
(1986) observed caregiver-child play interactions and found that,
compared to chronological age- and mental age-matched children
with mental retardation, children with autism less frequently dis-
played attention-sharing behaviors such as pointing to an object
or showing/giving an object to the caregiver. Curcio (1978) found
deficits in joint attention ability with autism, and revealed that
non-verbal children with autism showed imperative gestures (i.e.,
using an adult to obtain an object, event, or activity), but not
declarative ones (i.e., using an object to obtain the attention of
an adult). Finally, Baron-Cohen (1989) examined comprehension
and production of pointing, a key behavior of joint attention,
in children with autism. He found that, unlike in control chil-
dren, those with autism had difficulty both in comprehending and
producing declarative pointing.
For individuals with WS, Laing et al. (2002) also used the
ESCS (Seibert and Hogan, 1982). They revealed that toddlers
with WS more frequently engaged in dyadic, face-to-face inter-
actions, but less did so in triadic joint attention interaction (i.e.,
an interaction between the child, caregiver, and an external object
outside of the face-to-face interaction) than mental age-matched
typically developing infants. In addition to using the ESCS, in
another experiment they examined comprehension and produc-
tion of declarative pointing, and found that toddlers with WS
had difficulty with both. The discrepancy between imperative and
declarative communicative functioning, which was found with
individuals with ASD, has not been clearly found with individuals
with WS. However, recently, Asada et al. (2010b) found that chil-
dren with WS clarified what they wanted when they were given the
wrong object but not when their requests for objects were just ver-
bally misunderstood, while typically developing children corrected
others’ misunderstanding in both situations. Therefore, they sug-
gested that the characteristic of ASD, that is, impaired declarative
communicative functioning but relatively unimpaired imperative
functioning, might be found regarding verbal communications of
those with WS.
In addition, it appears there is a similarity in the developmental
relationship of joint attention behavior and language production
between individuals with ASD and WS. Carpenter et al.’s (2002)
cross-sectional study has pointed out that, contrary to both typi-
cally developing children and children with developmental delays,
there is a possibility that children with autism show a reverse
developmental pattern, that is, they may produce referential lan-
guage before engaging in joint attention behaviors. These findings
are surprising, considering that with typical development, words
are acquired partly through joint attention behaviors (e.g., Bald-
win, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Itoh’s (2000) longitudinal
study also demonstrated that, although this reverse pattern has
been found with other developmental disorders, the gap between
the onset of pointing behavior and language was not as long as
with individuals with autism (mean gap between onsets: autism,
7.8 months; moderate or severe mental retardation, 3 months).
This reverse developmental pattern also was found for WS, and the
duration of the gap was almost the same as that for autism. Specif-
ically, Mervis and Bertrand’s (1997) longitudinal study found that
children with WS followed this reverse pattern, with a gap between
onsets of 6 months. A delay in the onset of pointing, which is an
early milestone of social cognitive development, compared to that
of language, might suggest that verbal communication involving
social cognitive ability (e.g., pragmatics) will suffer both with ASD
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and WS. Due to differences in research methodology, it is dif-
ficult to directly compare these findings. However, at least the
developmental pathway of social communication in ASD and WS
is similar, and it might be related to later social deficits in both
disorders.
In sum, social cognitive ability (i.e., false belief understand-
ing and joint attention) is severely impaired with ASD and also
deficient with WS, although there is no direct comparison study
between the two disorders regarding the level of difficulties. In
addition, the relationship between the development of social cog-
nition and language is unique for both ASD and WS, and it might
lead to an atypical social communicative profile.
SOCIABILITY
Studies have examined sociability in ASD and WS. Here, we review
the degree to which individuals are interested in or motivated to
interact with other people. The biggest difference between ASD
and WS occurs in this area. Jones et al. (2000) gave the Salk Institute
Sociability Questionnaire to parents of individuals with autism,
WS, and Down syndrome, and to parents of typically develop-
ing individuals (each group was matched for chronological age).
According to a qualitative analysis of the questionnaires, a parent
of an individual with autism reported he needed a prompt to say
hello and avoided people whenever possible. In contrast, a par-
ent of an individual with WS reported that he was quite happy to
meet people and asked a lot of questions. In addition, a qualitative
analysis of the questionnaires revealed that individuals with WS
were rated as most sociable, individuals with autism were rated
as least sociable, and those with Down syndrome and typically
developing individuals were rated between WS and autism.
Other studies have reported disinterest and insensitivity to
social engagement in ASD. In a retrospective home video analy-
sis, Baranek (1999) reported that children with autism needed
more adult prompts to respond after their names were called
and more of them showed social touch aversions, compared to
children with developmental disabilities and typically develop-
ing children. In other home video analysis studies, Osterling and
colleagues (Osterling and Dawson, 1994; Osterling et al., 2002)
reported that children with ASD looked at others and oriented to
their names less frequently than children with mental retardation
or typically developing children. In addition, a study using obser-
vation of everyday school activities reported that children with
autism, on average, initiated communication only three to four
times per hour, and spontaneous communication was a relatively
rare event for these children (Stone and Caro-Martinez, 1990).
In contrast to ASD, sociable traits of individuals with WS have
been reported in various settings. Mervis et al. (2003) observed
a scene in a hospital, and found that especially younger children
with WS looked intensely at a medical staff, although none of the
children in other groups (e.g., children with developmental delay)
exhibited this behavior. Similarly, excessive looking at the experi-
menter by children with WS was reported during play and cogni-
tive assessment (Jones et al., 2000). In addition, Jones et al. (2000)
reported that, compared with chronological age-matched typically
developing children, children with WS less frequently exhibited
negative expressions, and if they occurred, the intensity of them
was milder during a task in which the children and their parents
were intentionally separated to observe their facial expressions.
Recently, Dodd et al. (2010) observed approach behaviors toward
strangers in play sessions, and found that pre-school children with
WS were more willing to approach others than chronological
age- or mental age-matched typically developing children. Only
pre-school children with WS initiated interactions with strangers
before the strangers noticed them, while none of the typically
developing children did so.
Other studies also have found individuals with WS strongly
motivated to interact with others. Jones et al. (2000) showed pho-
tographs of unfamiliar adult faces to individuals with WS and
chronological age- or mental age-matched typically developing
individuals, and asked them how much they would like to go up
to each person and begin a conversation. Those with WS rated the
faces more approachable than both comparison groups. This result
was replicated by a study using the same stimuli as Jones et al.’s
(2000) study (Martens et al., 2009). Frigerio et al. (2006) found that
individuals with WS rated positive faces more approachable and
negative faces less approachable than chronological age- or men-
tal age-matched typically developing individuals. Adolphs et al.
(2001) used the same approachability task as Jones et al. (2000),
and found that high-functioning individuals with autism rated
negative faces more approachable than typically developing indi-
viduals. Although we should be cautious whether this finding can
be generalized to others with ASD, considering that individuals
with ASD or WS tend to rate faces more approachable, this finding
might indicate social cognitive deficits rather than a motivation to
approach others.
Taken together, while individuals with WS have sociable traits
and actively want to interact with others, individuals with ASD are
relatively insensitive to others’ behaviors and are not so interested
in engaging socially.
COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS
In this section, we review communicative skills, mainly pragmatic
language ability. Pragmatic language ability is broadly defined as
the ability to use language in a social context for the purpose
of communication. With ASD, pragmatic language is thought to
be the most impaired among language abilities, while vocabulary
and grammar abilities are relatively less impaired (Tager-Flusberg,
1993, 2000; Fein et al., 1996; Kelly, 2011; Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2011). For example, vocabulary ability is a relative strength com-
pared with other language abilities (Fein et al., 1996; Kjelgaard and
Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Mottron, 2004). The developmental path-
way for grammatical ability in autism follows that of typically
developing children, although it is delayed (Tager-Flusberg et al.,
1990). Indeed, the level of language abilities is variable across indi-
viduals with ASD, but among them pragmatic language ability is
universally impaired (Kelly, 2011; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2011).
Some studies on pragmatic language ability have focused on
narrative skills of individuals with ASD. Losh and Capps (2003)
examined narrative skills of high-functioning children with autism
or Asperger syndrome, where they were asked to tell a story while
looking at a wordless picture book. Compared with chronolog-
ical age- and verbal IQ-matched typically developing children,
those with autism or Asperger syndrome did not differ in fre-
quency or range of evaluative devices such as intensifiers and
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 247 | 4
Asada and Itakura Autism and Williams syndrome
attention-getters. Similarly, it appears that narrative skills are rel-
atively unimpaired also in children with autism who have lower
verbal and cognitive abilities (Capps et al., 2000). Capps et al.
(2000) examined narrative skills of children with autism, chil-
dren with developmental delays, and typically developing children
using storybook narratives (the groups were matched for language
ability). They found several group differences between autistic and
typically developing groups; for example, children with autism and
children with developmental delays used a more restricted range of
evaluative devices such as references to characters’ internal states,
but not between autistic and developmental delays groups. The
fact that narrative skills are relatively unimpaired in these chil-
dren with ASD might be due to the demand of the storybook
narrative task. In this task, individuals did not need to respond to
what the listeners said but were asked to speak what they wanted.
Therefore, they might not need to recruit impaired skills such as
understanding the intention of others.
While previous studies focusing on storybook narratives
revealed relatively unimpaired performance by children with ASD,
it appears individuals with ASD tend to show more deficits
in interactive conversation, where more complex social com-
municative skills are needed, such as taking into consideration
another’s state of mind and making conversation relevant to
the topic. Paul et al. (2009) observed conversational behaviors
with examiners, and found that, compared with chronologi-
cal age-matched typically developing counterparts, adolescents
with Asperger syndrome had more difficulty commenting per-
tinent to the topic, taking into account the listener’s knowledge
background, providing the proper amount of information, and
maintaining a reciprocal conversational exchange. Also, Capps
et al. (1998) observed informal conversation about vacationing,
friends, and school, and found that children with autism more
often provided no response to comments by the other person, less
often gave new and relevant information on an ongoing topic,
and more often made bizarre or idiosyncratic responses, com-
pared with language age-matched children with developmental
delays.
Similar to ASD, for individuals with WS, vocabulary ability
seems to be the strongest area among their language abilities
(Brock, 2007). Bellugi et al. (2000) revealed that vocabulary age
with WS was significantly better relative to what would be expected
from their overall mental age. Unlike an earlier claim that the
grammar ability of individuals with WS was intact (Pinker, 1999),
the level of grammar ability is below their chronological age, and
is thought to be almost on par with their overall mental age
(Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 2004; Brock, 2007).
Compared to other aspects of language, studies regarding prag-
matic language of individuals with WS are quite few. The debate
concerning whether and how much pragmatic language ability
with WS is impaired continues. Recently, however, evidence has
been accumulating suggesting it is atypical and impaired.
As with ASD, individuals with WS appear to show relative
strength in providing narratives, but have deficits in conversa-
tion that requires taking others into account. Reilly et al. (2004)
analyzed how children with WS told a story while looking at a
picture book. They found that, as compared to children with spe-
cific language impairment (a developmental disorder diagnosed
on the basis of difficulties with language in a child who is oth-
erwise developing normally in the absence of any obvious cause)
and typically developing children, children with WS produced a
greater proportion of social engagement devices, such as sound
effects and audience hookers. Also, Lacroix et al. (2007) found
that children and adolescents with WS showed relatively good per-
formance during narrative production, but produced fewer utter-
ances, played a weaker role, and less often satisfied the partner’s
requests during conversation, compared to mental age-matched
typically developing children.
Recent studies have shown that individuals with WS have dif-
ficulty in other areas of pragmatic language. Laws and Bishop
(2004) used the Children’s Communication Checklist (Bishop,
1998) or a modified version of it for parents or teachers of individ-
uals with WS, Down syndrome, or specific language impairment.
They revealed that the WS group scored well below the cut-off
score at which individuals are categorized as having pragmatic
difficulties, while the Down syndrome group and the specific lan-
guage impairment group both scored at about the cut-off. In
addition, the WS group showed difficulties especially with the
inappropriate initiation of conversation and the use of stereo-
typed conversation, and scored lower on these subscales than
both the Down syndrome group and the specific language impair-
ment group. Moreover, individuals with WS also have difficulty in
making comments relevant to the topic of conversation, sharing
their knowledge background with the other person, and repair-
ing communication breakdowns. Stojanovik (2006) investigated
the social interaction abilities of children with WS using semi-
structured conversations. She found that, compared to children
with specific language impairment, children with WS were more
likely to produce longer verbal responses, but they were less likely
to include new information in their replies. Asada et al. (2010a)
found that, while children with WS, in general, showed the same
amount of language as verbal mental age-matched typically devel-
oping children, children with WS showed less attention-sharing
communication. Another study reported that children with WS
had difficulty in clarifying what they meant when the listener did
not understand them, compared to mental age-matched typically
developing children (Asada et al., 2010b). Also, John et al. (2009)
reported that the skill of repairing communication breakdowns
was related to performance on false belief tasks, suggesting that
the pragmatic language deficits with WS relates to their social
cognitive ability level.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study that
directly compares the pragmatic language ability of people with
ASD to those with WS. Philofsky et al. (2007) used the Children’s
Communication Checklist Second Edition (Bishop, 2003) for par-
ents, and directly compared the results for children with ASD with
that of children with WS. They found that overall pragmatic func-
tioning, that is, the sum of the pragmatic language subscales of
inappropriate initiation, stereotyped language, use of context, and
non-verbal communication, was more severely impaired with ASD
than with WS. However, the extent of difficulties in the inappro-
priate initiation of conversation and the use of context did not
significantly differ between the groups, although children with
WS were rated as more impaired than children with ASD on the
inappropriate initiation subscale.
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Taken together, the overall language profile of relative strengths
(e.g., vocabulary) and weaknesses (e.g., pragmatics) is alike
between ASD and WS individuals. Within pragmatic language
ability, both individuals with ASD and WS have relatively unim-
paired narrative skills, but difficulty with communication involv-
ing more social communicative demands, such as taking into
account another’s mental state and commenting relevant to the
topic at hand, although individuals with ASD generally are more
impaired than individuals with WS.
The fact that ASD and WS individuals showed similar profiles
on communicative skills might be due to social cognitive deficits.
Some theorists on pragmatics have claimed that social cognitive
skills are needed for pragmatic language comprehension (Sper-
ber and Wilson, 1987), and indeed for both individuals with ASD
and WS a direct relationship between pragmatic language ability
and social cognitive skills was found in several studies (Happé,
1993; Surian et al., 1996; Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2005; John
et al., 2009). Studies of language acquisition in typical develop-
ment suggest that vocabulary ability is achieved in several ways,
such as inferring speaker intention and use of the mutual exclu-
sivity rule (i.e., every object has only a single label; Markman and
Wachtel, 1988; Baldwin, 1995). One study revealed that children
with autism learned new words through mutual exclusivity but not
by inferring speaker intention (Preissler and Carey, 2005). There-
fore, in ASD, vocabulary might be acquired by using only restricted
strategies compared with those of typically developing children.
We still do not know whether this leads not only to late onset
of language but also to later pragmatic language deficits. People
might have to learn vocabulary linking to social context where it
is used, or learn it while inferring speaker intention in order to
use it appropriately. Future studies should explore whether lan-
guage acquisition without using social cognitive skills would lead
to pragmatic language deficits in ASD and WS.
CONCLUSION
Although further cross-syndrome direct comparison studies
between ASD and WS are needed, our conclusion regarding the
similarities and differences between these two disorders are as fol-
lows. (1) Individuals with these disorders show quite contrasting
phenotypes with respect to face processing (i.e., preference to faces
and eyes) and sociability (i.e., interest in and motivation to inter-
act with others). (2) Although the ADOS and a direct comparison
study of pragmatic language ability suggest more deficits with ASD,
individuals with WS are similarly impaired with regard to social
cognition and communicative skills. Focusing only on sociability,
ASD and WS can be viewed as polar opposite disorders (e.g., Jones
et al., 2000). However, as we have noted, recent studies have discov-
ered a number of similarities between them, and a growing body
of evidence suggests a need to focus on the shared characteristics
of these disorders.
There are some limitations of this review. The first has to do
with diagnostic categories, levels of functioning, and severity of
symptoms. While focusing on a comparison of ASD and WS,
we were not able to take a close look at differences according to
subcategories on ASD, or to thoroughly consider related levels of
functioning (e.g., IQ) or the severity of symptoms. Second is the
lack of availability of good comparison group studies focusing on
either ASD or WS. That is, some studies recruited only typically
developing control group and others used more than one control
group, such as individuals with intellectual disabilities without
ASD or WS in addition to typically developing controls. Third
is the developmental effect of age. According to a report on the
anatomical development of the amygdala, compared to typically
developing individuals, the volume of the amygdala in individuals
with ASD is larger in childhood but not so in adolescence (Schu-
mann et al., 2004). Therefore, symptom expression that relates to
amygdala functioning could vary across age ranges due in part
to maturation. Recently, research methodology focusing on age-
related changes has been utilized for developmental disorders (e.g.,
Annaz et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2009). More studies using such
a developmental trajectory analysis are needed.
Knowing more about the similarities and differences between
these two well-documented disorders could contribute much to
both academic and clinical endeavors. First, developmental the-
ory could be more refined. As South et al. (2011) hypothesized,
early inadequate motivation for social engagement would lead
to less social experience, which subsequently would contribute
to eventual later social-perceptual and social-cognitive deficits.
For ASD, this seems to be a reasonable hypothesis. On the other
hand, individuals with WS display adequate (and even extraor-
dinary) interest in social engagement, and probably have a lot of
social experiences. However, as this integrative review indicates,
this characteristic of WS does not necessarily lead to functional
social skills. One of the clues to this puzzle may come from a com-
putational model proposed by Triesch et al. (2006). According to
them, both excessive (as with WS) and scarce (as with ASD) interest
in faces should lead to deficits in gaze-following skills, which are an
important component of joint attention ability. This is probably
because it is difficult to link the partner’s eyes (or attention) to the
target that the partner is attending to in both cases. That means
different characteristics of face processing and sociability between
ASD and WS could predict the same outcome: deficits in social
cognition. The developmental pathway leading to some difficulty
could be different between ASD and WS, even if the difficulty looks
similar.
However, other components, which were not examined here,
might be related to the social difficulty in ASD and WS. Karmiloff-
Smith (2008) proposed that low-level attention deficits could lead
to higher-level linguistic and cognitive deficits since saccadic eye
movements involve following the partner’s focus of attention,
which is related to social understanding and language acquisition.
There has been evidence on deficits with saccadic eye movement
and attentional control both in ASD and WS (Goldberg et al., 2002;
Brown et al., 2003; Landry and Bryson, 2004; Van der Geest et al.,
2004). Further studies examining the effects on social development
both from inside and outside of the social domains will help us
to understand how development proceeds in these developmental
disorders.
Second, neural substrates of social behavioral phenotypes can
be identified. Although brain imaging studies of WS still are few,
there is considerable evidence available regarding the neural sub-
strates of social behavioral phenotypes of ASD (see Amaral et al.,
2008 for a review). The amygdala is one of the well-studied parts of
the brain for both disorders. With ASD, amygdala hypoactivation
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was found during the task of interpreting emotional states from
viewing eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and of processing fear-
ful faces (Ashwin et al., 2007). With WS, the volume of the right
amygdala is correlated to how “approachable” participants rate
faces in an approachability task (Martens et al., 2009). In addition,
Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2005) revealed that, in contrast to typ-
ically developing individuals, those with WS showed heightened
activation of the amygdala to non-social stimuli, and less activation
to social stimuli. Therefore, atypical amygdala functioning might
be related to social cognitive impairment and aberrant sociability
for both disorders. Given that ASD and WS have similar social
cognitive deficits but different aspects of sociability, the amygdala
might be differentially impaired or other neural domains linked
to the amygdala might be related to these two disorders. How-
ever, we should keep in mind that aspects of amygdala functioning
still are under debate (e.g., arousal rather than social cognition;
South et al., 2011). For ASD, the exploration of neural substrates
for impaired social behavioral phenotypes is relatively advanced
(e.g., superior temporal sulcus for gaze processing, Pelphrey et al.,
2005; medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus, and tem-
poral poles for attributing mental states, Castelli et al., 2002).
Future studies should examine brain functioning in these areas
regarding WS.
Third, intervention techniques could be shared. The impaired
social phenotypes that this article revealed both in ASD and WS are
with respect to social cognitive and communicative skills. Indeed,
many of the intervention techniques for ASD focus on these same
areas (e.g., social skills training; see Howlin and Charman, 2011 for
a review). As Klein-Tasman et al. (2007) pointed out, intervention
techniques for ASD were developed to improve behavioral phe-
notypes, rather than to address the biological causes of disorders,
and therefore these techniques should be helpful for other devel-
opmental disorders with similar difficulties. Considering that few
interventions have been developed for WS, it might be helpful for
clinicians and parents to consider these techniques for WS. How-
ever, rigorous trials to test the effectiveness of these techniques
for ASD still are few in number (Howlin and Charman, 2011).
The determination of the effectiveness of each technique for each
disorder is necessary and very important.
Finally, this past decade has seen dramatic improvements in
the study of developmental disorders. Hereafter, cross-syndrome
studies focusing on social phenotypes other than face processing
and brain imaging studies will be beneficial in determining the
characteristics of these developmental disorders. We believe such
attempts will make further contributions to understanding each
disorder, and what intervention techniques might be effective for
clinical treatments.
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